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Gender and the Tournament: Reinventing Antidiscrimination
Law in an Age of Inequality
© Naomi Cahn, * June Carbone, ** & Nancy Levit ***

Abstract
Since the 1970’s, antidiscrimination advocates have approached Title VII as
though the impact of the law on minorities and women could be considered in isolation.
This article argues that this is a mistake. Instead, Gender and the Tournament attempts
to reclaim Title VII’s original approach, which justified efforts to dismantle segregated
workplaces as necessary to both eliminate discrimination and promote economic
growth. Using that approach, this Article is the first to consider how widespread
corporate tournaments and growing gender disparities in the upper echelons of the
economy are intrinsically intertwined, and how they undermine the core promises of
antidiscrimination law. The Article draws on a pending case challenging the “rank and
yank” evaluation system at Microsoft, as well as social science literature regarding
narcissism and stereotype expectations, to illustrate how consideration of the legitimacy
of competitive pay for performance schemes is essential to combating the intrinsically
gendered nature of advancement in the new economy.
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INTRODUCTION
Ellen Pao galvanized attention to the plight of women in the financial world
by suing Kleiner Perkins, Silicon Valley’s storied venture capital firm, for sex
discrimination. Only six percent of venture capital partners are women, 1 and
Perkins enticed Pao to the firm with promises of advancement. Yet, after seven
years in her job, she found the promises hollow. She alleged that men were
promoted ahead of women, that the firm embraced men’s business promotion more
readily than women’s, and that it provided little support for women who experienced
sexual harassment, a not uncommon occurrence in the financial world. Pao charged
that Kleiner Perkins was a “boys’ club,” with gender-coded evaluations and different

1

Davey Alba, Ellen Pao Ends Her Lawsuit Against Kleiner Perkins, WIRED BUS. (Sept. 10,
2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/09/ellen-pao-ends-lawsuit-kleiner-perkins/. And that
number represents a drop from 10% in 1999 to 6% in 2015. Vivian Giang, Why the Few
Women Venture Capitalists Often Give up, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 4, 2015),
https://www.fastcompany.com/3041862/strong-female-lead/why-the-few-women-venturecapitalists-often-give-up.
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standards of advancement for men and women. 2 While the firm claimed to prize
initiative and drive, Pao’s performance reviews dinged her for “sharp elbows,” 3 a
trait rarely criticized among the men. Following a five-week trial in 2015, the trial
court dismissed her case.
In September 2014, Katherine Moussouris and two other women filed a
class action lawsuit against Microsoft. 4 They claimed that Microsoft’s “stack
ranking” system,” which graded technical and engineering employees on a forced
curve, discriminated against women. The system identifies a top group in line to
receive bigger bonuses and promotion opportunities, a middle group of adequate
employees, and a bottom group whom the company encouraged to leave. The
ranking system created internal competition that supposedly aligned employee
objectives with the company mission, but it has also been the subject of a withering
management analysis that finds it destructive. Although Microsoft abandoned the
system after Moussouris filed the class action, a large number of Fortune 500
companies use similar systems. 5 And the action against Microsoft is continuing. 6
***
Two literatures increasingly take aim at the worlds of Ellen Pao and
Katherine Moussouris – and the workplaces that have most contributed to increasing
gender inequality. The first challenges practices in the new economy, such as the
corporate “tournament” 7 that valorizes intense competition either as an end in itself
2

Ruth Reader, Ellen Pao’s Lawyer Concludes: Kleiner Perkins Is a Boys’ Club, VENTURE
BEAT (Mar. 24, 2015), http://venturebeat.com/2015/03/24/ellen-paos-lawyer-concludeskleiner-perkins-is-a-boys-club/.
3
Patrick Kulp, 5 Things We Learned About Silicon Valley Culture from the Ellen Pao Trial,
(Mar.
29,
2015),
http://mashable.com/2015/03/29/ellen-pao-trialMASHABLe
recap/#obaH6S8iSkq5.
4
Complaint, Sept 16, 2015 Docket No. 2:15-cv-01483 (W.D. Wash. Sept 16, 2015).
5
Jeanne Sahadi, Amazon Workplace Story Raises Dread of ‘Rank and Yank’ Reviews,
MONEY (Aug. 17, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/17/news/amazon-performancereview/.
6
Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., Case No. C15-1483JLR, Order at 4 (W.D. Wash., Oct. 14,
2016). On May 2, 2017, the court appointed a Special Master to make discovery
recommendations. Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., Case No. C15-1483JLR, Order
Appointing
Special
Master
(W.D.
Wash.),
http://www.leagle.com/decision/In%20FDCO%2020170503G54/MOUSSOURIS%20v.%2
0MICROSOFT%20CORPORATION.
7
Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2002):
These executives are hyper-motivated survivors of a highly competitive
tournament . . . who have proven their ability to make money while putting
on a veneer of loyalty to the firm. At least some of the new breed appear
to be Machiavellian, narcissistic, prevaricating, pathologically optimistic,
free from self-doubt and moral distractions, willing to take great risk as the
company moves up and to lie when things turn bad, and nurtured by a
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or as an aid to the pursuit of reductionist short-term objectives. While many continue
to defend the system 8 as necessary to create more dynamic corporate environments
in a rapidly changing world of technological change and globalization, an increasing
number of scholars maintain that the new system has not outperformed the earlier
managerial model 9 and has arguably contributed, both to a decline in productivity
growth and to greater societal inequality. 10 More critically, a growing chorus of
management experts specifically identifies the emphasis on “sharp elbows” that such
systems produce as counterproductive. Even some of the original champions of
these corporate “reforms” describe the hypercompetitive practices that have resulted
as negative sum competitions that destroy teamwork, undermine ethical practices, 11
and reduce long-term institutional health. 12 Indeed, Forbes Magazine referred to
Microsoft’s rank-and-yank system as “The Management Approach Guaranteed to
Wreck Your Best People.” 13
A second literature looks at the failure of antidiscrimination law to address
the increasing gender gaps in the new economy. 14 To be sure, overall gender
corporate culture that instills loyalty to insiders, obsession with short-term
stock price, and intense distrust of outsiders.
8
See, e.g., Commentary: Jack Welch, ‘Rank-and-Yank?’ That’s Not How It’s Done, WALL
ST.
J.,
Nov.
14,
2013,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303789604579198281053673534.
9
Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of
Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1171 (2013).
10
See, e.g., RETHINKING CAPITALISM: ECONOMICS AND POLICY FOR SUSTAINABLE AND
INCLUSIVE GROWTH 7 (Michael Jacobs & Mariana Mazzucato eds. 2016) (linking “secular
stagnation” or low productivity growth to short-termism and a decline in investment)
11
Perhaps the most notable scholar to recant is Michael C. Jensen, who helped usher in
modern executive compensation systems. See Michael C. Jensen, Paying People to Lie: The
Truth about the Budgeting Process, 9 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 379 (2003) (observing that using
budgets or targets in an organization’s performance measurement and compensation systems
has encourages gaming the system); see also Lynn Stout, Killing Conscience: The
Unintended Behavioral Consequences of 'Pay for Performance', 39 J. CORP. L. 529, 533
(2014) (describing the counterproductive effectives of modern executive compensation).
12
The impact on institutional health is a product of three overlapping forces. First is the
emphasis on shareholder primacy and the short-termism associated with it. See supra notes
9 and 10. Second is pay for performance and the perverse incentives it creates. See supra
notes 11 and 12. Third is financialization, both because of the promotion of short-termism in
publicly traded companies and because of the incentives in financial firms to promote opaque
products as the expense of customers and long term institutional health. See, e.g., CLAIRE
A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS: PROMOTING GOOD
BUSINESS THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT 102-03 (2015)(describing the practices
that led to the financial crisis).
13
Erika Anderson, The Management Approach Guaranteed to Wreck Your Best People,
FORBES (July 2012).
14
See, e.g., Arianne Renan Barzilay & Anat Ben-David, Platform Inequality: Gender in the
Gig
Economy, 47 SETON HALL L. REV.
393 (2017); Deborah
Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63 SMU L. REV. 17, 26
(2010); U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Diversity in High Tech,
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disparities, including the wage gap between men and women’s earnings, have
narrowed. 15 Yet, the trends have moved in the opposite direction at the top.
Controlling for a broader range of factors, such as education and hours worked, the
extent to which men have outpaced women has been particularly dramatic for those
with earnings above the 90% income percentile. 16 Today, the greatest gender
disparities occur in the portions of the economy that have shown the greatest growth
in compensation, including the upper management ranks, such as those at Microsoft,
and the financial sector, which includes the venture capital world of Kleiner Perkins.
Overwhelmingly, this second literature concludes that these gender disparities arise
from “structural forces” that Title VII has had difficulty addressing. 17
Legal scholars, courts, and legislatures have developed these two literatures
as separate discourses. 18 This Article is the first to consider how the negative sum
competition and growing gender disparities in the upper echelons of the economy
are intrinsically intertwined, and how they then undermine the core promises of
antidiscrimination law. As it shows, so long as the discourses remain separate,
counterproductive business practices that contribute to societal inequality and
entrench group-based disparities escape censure because these practices simply look
like routine, legally justifiable business decisions. The Article argues for a
substantive engagement with the legitimacy of the business practices that
systematically produce gender disparities. 19 It concludes that this is the first step in
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/reports/hightech/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2017); Julia
Tomassetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm? The Postindustrial Corporation and Advanced
Information Technology, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2016).
15
Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 24.
16
Elise Gould, Jessica Schieder, & Kathleen Geier, What Is the Gender Pay Gap and Is It
Real?, Figs. B, D (2016), http://www.epi.org/publication/what-is-the-gender-pay-gap-andis-it-real/.
17
See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 458 (2001) (defining these forms of bias); cf. Samuel
R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2006) (observing that “structural employment inequalities cannot be solved
without going beyond the generally accepted normative underpinnings of antidiscrimination
law”); see generally Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 93 (2015)
(describing the structural approach).
18
A limited exception is the literature that developed following the financial crisis
commenting on the relative dearth of women in the decision-making centers most
responsible for the crisis. See, e.g., SCANDALOUS ECONOMICS: GENDER AND THE POLITICS
OF FINANCIAL CRISES ch. 2, 3 (Aida A. Hozić & Jacqui True, eds. 2016). This literature,
however, does not address anti-discrimination law or the potential legal remedies.
19
This article focuses only on the relationship between negative sum workplace competitions
and gender disparities, because the distinctive interaction between gender and negative sum
workplace competitions. Similar practices may influence disparities based on race, age, or
other legally actionable categories. See, e.g., Karraker v. Rent-a-Center, Inc., 411 F.3d 831
(7th Cir. 2005), on remand, 2005 WL 2001511 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2005), on remand, 2005
WL 297652 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2005) (prohibiting use of a personality inventory as a basis for
promotion because of its impact on those with disabilities).

5

moving towards “equality law,” which returns to the origins of antidiscrimination
law and recasts it as part of a broader effort to address the structural forces that
simultaneously entrench group-based disparities and restrain economic growth.
Equality law involves the identification of substantive employment practices
inconsistent with a commitment to economic equality, and delegitimization of these
practices as inappropriate when applied to any employee. 20
Part I excavates the history of Title VII, showing that the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 was enacted to dismantle the racially and sex-segregated workplaces of
midcentury America through the combination of antidiscrimination law, economic
stimulus and education and training. As this history shows, Title VII, to be effective
in combating discrimination, has to be interpreted in light of the economic realities
of the employment systems in which it is operating.
Part II examines the new structural forces that simultaneously increase
income inequality in the economy 21 and gender disparities in the economic sectors
that have produced the greatest income growth. The new economy, which has arisen
with the information revolution and globalization, has replaced the lock-step career
ladders and relatively egalitarian tiers of the industrial era with workplaces that
valorize individualism and competition, 22 generating much more steeply banked
income hierarchies 23 that threaten to undermine teamwork, productivity, and
investment in the future. It also creates a triple bind for women, who become less
likely to seek out such workplaces, less likely to be seen as having the qualities
necessary to succeed within them, and more likely to penalized when they display
the same self-interested qualities as the men, further discouraging future
applications. 24 This section establishes the links between the new management
system and the exacerbation of gender disparities, requiring a reorientation in the
focus of antidiscrimination law.

20

The term “equality law” is used here to describe approaches that arise from combining
traditional antidiscrimination analysis with consideration of the substantive justifications that
determine the legitimacy of inequality enhancing practices. This article, however, does not
take a position on whether “equality” in some abstract sense should always be favored at the
expense of other objectives. Nor does it suggest that the fact that a practice increases
inequality is grounds to consider it illegitimate per se. Instead, it maintains only that where
practices contribute to overall economic inequality or to race, gender, and other disparities,
their substantive justifications on business terms should be interrogated rather than assumed.
21
See, e.g., Timothy Noah, Income Inequality: Panel on Financialization, Economic
Opportunity, and the Future of American Democracy, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 57, 57-58
(2013).
22
Am. Ass’n Univ. Women, The Simple Truth About the Gender Pay Gap (2013),
http://www.aauw.org/files/2013/03/the-simple-truth-about-the-gender-pay-gap-2013.pdf.
23
June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1031 (2017).
24
Of course, not all women act in the same way, and many of the stereotypes about women
are just that – stereotypes. See, e.g., CORDELIA FINE, TESTOSTERONE REX: MYTHS OF SEX,
SCIENCE, AND SOCIETY (2017); Coren Apicella & Johanna Mollderstrom, Women Do Like
to Compete – Against Themselves,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/opinion/sunday/women-do-like-to-compete-againstthemselves.html.
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Part III shows how these structural changes explain the failure of
antidiscrimination law to deal with individual cases similar to the one Ellen Pao
brought against Kleiner Perkins while opening the door to more effective claims
such as Katherine Moussouris’s class action suit against Microsoft. Pao’s suit took
the Kleiner Perkins evaluation system as a given, requiring an intrinsically
subjective evaluation of whether her contributions to the company outweighed her
“sharp elbows” in the same way they did for the men. In contrast, the Moussouris
case makes the validity of the underlying business practices the central legal issue.
The case focuses attention not just on Microsoft’s failure to create an environment
in which women can thrive, but also on the systemic links between negative sum
competitions and gender disparities. This section thus argues that antidiscrimination
efforts, to be more effective, need to interrogate the background business practices
that are embedded in corporate cultures.
The conclusion explores how equality law might be remade. The original
passage of antidiscrimination law took aim at the structural factors that produced
segregated workplaces and sought not just to outlaw discrimination but to address
the economic forces that perpetuated market segmentation. In contrast, modern
antidiscrimination discourse has tended to separate consideration of the structural
factors producing the tournament mentality from the greater inequality the
tournament creates, treating the resulting gender disparities as either presumptively
valid or outside of the scope of Title VII altogether. 25 The recreation of an equality
law approach would identify the structural forces that produce inequality and
consider the legitimacy of the practices. Where the practices cannot be justified,
equality law would root them out through the combination of antidiscrimination law
and structural reforms. 26 This article is thus a first step toward reuniting equality
promotion with antidiscrimination approaches.
I. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY
Congress enacted Title VII and other laws at the height of the Civil Rights
movement of mid-twentieth century America. 27 Yet, while these laws clearly
condemned discrimination in employment, they did not just seek to promote racial
25

See Sturm, supra note 17.
For an example of possible structural forms unrelated to gender disparities, see Lynne L.
Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 541 (2016).
27
This was a period in which income equality had fallen markedly, led primarily by gains
for working class white men and more restrained executive and professional incomes. See
Claudia Goldin & Robert A. Margo, The Great Compression: The U.S. Wage Structure at
Mid-Century, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1 (Feb. 1992). The Gini coefficient—the most widely accepted
statistical measure of income inequality in a country—shows a four decades’ rise in America
since the late 1960s to today. The Major Trends in U.S. Income Inequality Since 1947,
CALCULATIONS
(Dec.
4,
2013),
POLITICAL
http://politicalcalculations.blogspot.com/2013/12/the-major-trends-in-us-income.html#.
V3xWYk32aUl.
26
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and gender equality in isolation. Instead, their proponents sought to address what
they saw as a broad-based structural issue: the segmentation of the economy that
marginalized women and minority workers and obstructed economic growth. 28
White men during this period already enjoyed a remarkable degree of economic
equality, security and wage growth, 29 so the goal was to make these opportunities
available to other groups. President Kennedy, who initially proposed what became
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other antidiscrimination measures, 30 did so as part
of a multi-faceted approach that linked antidiscrimination efforts to economic
equality and national prosperity.
Modern Title VII scholars argue that today’s limits on the advancement of
women and minorities have become “structural” in nature, following from the
change in promotion practices from lockstep advancement to performance pay and
lateral moves that rest on “patterns of interaction, informal norms, networking,
mentoring, and evaluation.” 31 Yet, Title VII’s origins indicate that it addressed a
much more explicit form of structural inequality – the segmentation of the labor
market into white male jobs, with security, benefits, and lock-step patterns of
advancement, and other less attractive jobs for black men, white women and black
women – and sought to delegitimize this segmentation.
This Section reviews the development of antidiscrimination employment
laws. It first explores the legislative history that demonstrates the structural nature
of the antidiscrimination efforts, their focus on opening the portals to jobs that
provided security and advancement, and the nature of the links between those laws
and the parallel efforts to promote economic growth. Second, it examines the early
cases interpreting Title VII, and their relationship to the structural purpose of the
legislation. Third, the section assesses the success of the antidiscrimination efforts,
demonstrating that their principal successes came from the structural reforms they
produced.
A. Title VII’s Structural Approach

28

See, e.g., Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal
Change, and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 305, 322 (2013) (noting the role of “labor-management concordat” following
World War II in which “labor unions received income and benefits sufficient to carry their
members into the middle class”). For data showing steady increase in household income
between 1950 and 1965, see United States Median Household Income: 1950-1990,
http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci120a/immigration/Median%20Household%20Income.p
df (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
29
See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA, 1960-2010
(2013) (documenting the stability of white men’ jobs).
30
See John F. Kennedy, Report to the American People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963),
https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/LH8F_0Mzv0e6Ro1yEm74Ng.aspx.
31
Sturm, supra note 17, at 458.
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Advocates of Title VII, which focuses on discrimination in employment,
recognized that the restricted access to “good jobs” 32 helped to keep wages for these
positions high by restricting the pool of potential employees. 33 This further had the
effect of discouraging investment in the human capital of those excluded, and meant
that general efforts to boost employment through macroeconomic policies did not
necessarily reach the entire country. As a result, discrimination hurt not just those
treated unfavorably by the discrimination but the economy as a whole.
In 1963, President Kennedy proposed antidiscrimination legislation that
framed the effort to prohibit employment discrimination in terms of the promotion
of greater economic growth. He had entered office during a recession, persuaded
Congress to adopt tax cuts and other stimulus measures, and yet had been frustrated
by the fact that while corporate profits soared, unemployment remained stubbornly
high. 34 Indeed, the legislative history of Title VII identified the expansion of the
labor market to include full utilization of the country’s human resources as a matter
of national interest, and full employment as a national policy, separate and apart
from antidiscrimination as an important objective. 35
Kennedy saw the solution as a three part effort to reduce inequality. First,
he introduced Title VII, which sought to dismantle racially segregated workplaces
that Kennedy maintained obstructed economic growth. 36 Second, he proposed
continuation of the economic stimulus that had already boosted business profits,
implicitly recognizing that without jobs for everyone, antidiscrimination efforts
might simply lower the benefits associated with white male workplaces. 37 Third, he
advocated education and training efforts for African-American so that disparities in
the qualifications of potential employees could not be used to justify segregated
workplaces. 38 All three efforts focused on opening what had been “narrow portals”
into entry-level employment opportunities. 39 This structural focus on the American
economy framed the legislation.
32

See ARNE L. KALLEBERG, GOOD JOBS, BAD JOBS: THE RISE OF POLARIZED AND
PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970S-2000S at 5-6
(2011)(defining good jobs as those that pay well, offer benefits and provide security).
33
See Ruth G. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 12 MICH. J. L. REFORM 397, 401-15 (1979) (describing impact of
segmented workforce on wages).
34
See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 2730, 2732 (1964), file:///C:/Users/ncahn/Downloads/CR-19640210-PL88-352-H.pdf. (“the economic health of the Nation would be improved through
fuller and fairer utilization of available and potential manpower”).
35
Id.
36
See Kennedy, supra note 30.
37
See, e.g., Paul Burstein & Mark Evan Edwards, The Impact of Employment Discrimination
Litigation on Racial Disparity in Earnings: Evidence and Unresolved Issues, 28 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 79 (1994).
38
Kennedy’s original proposal did not address sex discrimination. See infra discussion in
text at notes 41-49.
39
Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account
of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 99-100 (2003), citing
Katherine V. W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing
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Although Title VII did not originally address sex discrimination, its
inclusion—on the floor of the House of Representatives 40—served as a recognition
that women faced many of the same forms of explicitly discriminatory practices as
racial minorities. The want ads of the day, after all, listed job openings under “male”
and “female” categories, signaling the gendered nature of the employment. 41
Moreover, career advancement depended to a much greater degree than today on
winning access to the entry-level positions in a relatively smaller number of large
corporations. 42 Howard Smith of Virginia, who proposed the addition of sex
discrimination to the bill, appeared to be motivated by the structural nature of the
legislation. 43 He supported women’s rights (as well as the racism common in the
Virginia of his day), and observed that he “did not want ‘his’ women to take second
place to men and women of other races.” 44 He thus understood that a principal effect
of antidiscrimination law would be to increase access to a larger number of good
Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 535 (2001)(describing
the jobs of the era as “characterized by job ladders, limited ports of entry, and implicit
contracts for long-term job security.”).
40
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577–
2584 (1964)).
41
Ads From The State Seeking “Male Help” and “Female Help,” (June 1958), TEACHING
AMERICAN
HISTORY
IN
SOUTH
CAROLINA,
http://www.teachingushistory.org/ttrove/wantads.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2016). For a
broader discussion of the nature of sex segregation before and after passage of the
antidiscrimination acts, see. Blumrosen, supra note 33, at 402-15 (concluding that even after
passage of Title VII, sex-segregated jobs account for as much or more of the gendered wage
gap than unequal treatment within the same jobs).
42
Blumrosen, supra note 33, at 412 (observing that white and minority men both enjoyed
upward wage trajectories over time (with smaller gains for minority men) while women’s
income curves tended to remain flat).
43
Although the conventional story is that the addition of “sex” was an afterthought, designed
to sink the legislation, this appears to be a myth. Some commentators maintain that the
amendment to add “sex” by racist Representative Howard Smith of Virginia was intended to
mock the bill and thwart its passage. Clay Risen, The Accidental Feminist, SLATE (Feb. 7,
2014,
12:54
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/02/the_50th_
anniversary_of_title_vii_of_the_civil_rights_act_and_the_southern.html. But see Mary
Anne Case, Legal Protections for the "Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title VII’s
Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the
Prospect of ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1339 (2014) (arguing that Smith in fact supported
women’s rights). In the House of Representatives, the bill passed by a somewhat anemic
vote of 168 to 133. Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L.
REV. 431, 442 (1966); see also Arianne Renan Barzilay, Parenting Title VII: Rethinking the
History of the Sex Discrimination Prohibition, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 55, 94 (2016);
Robert C. Bird, More than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History of
Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137 (1997);
Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)history, 95 B.U. L. REV. 713,
718-21 (2015).
44
Case, supra note 43, at 1339.
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jobs, tempting employers in need of low wage workers to look to women to fill the
gaps – unless the law prohibited both race and sex discrimination. 45
Similarly, African-American women saw racial and gender equality as
linked for similar reasons. 46 Discrimination on the basis of race and sex relegated
them out of more desirable jobs altogether. 47 Pauli Murray argued that segregated
workplaces allowed employers to pit workers against each other.48
Antidiscrimination law, by breaking down the barriers that segmented these
workplaces by race and gender while continuing economic stimulus that kept the
pressure on wage growth, promised to lift the floor, allowing all workers to enjoy
the same benefits as white males and eliminating the existence of marginalized
groups who could be hired for less and set in opposition to each other. 49
B. The Judicial Construction of Title VII and the Antidiscrimination Principle
By the early seventies, the integration of antidiscrimination law with efforts
to promote more general economic equality largely came to an end. Stagflation,
rather than recession, dogged the economy, and the Nixon Administration distanced
itself from the “war on poverty’s” more ambitious equality enhancing measures. 50
The antidiscrimination principle remained important, however, and the courts
refined the Title VII approach through judicial decisions that continued the efforts
to dismantle segregated workplaces.
These decisions reflected Title VII’s structural origins as an effort to
delegitimize all-white and all-male workplaces. Like the legislative debate,
45

Congresswoman Martha Griffiths, who supported the amendment, also claimed that
without it, “white women would be last at the hiring gate.” 110 CONG. REC. 2577, 2578-2580
(1964) (statement of Rep. Griffith).
46
While tensions existed from the beginning between advocates of racial and gender
equality, African-American women embraced the new law.
Even before the
antidiscrimination law passed, black women were more likely to be in the workplace, more
likely to be single mothers, and less likely to enjoy protection from either the protections
available to blue-collar men or to more privileged women. They thus saw antidiscrimination
laws as providing a vehicle to fight the marginalization of the positions open to them. See,
e.g., Cary Franklin, Inventing the "Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1307, 1327 (2012); Serena Mayeri, "A Common Fate of Discrimination”: RaceGender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045, 1058 (2001).
47
Mayeri, Intersectionality, supra note 46, at 717-21.
48
Id. at 721.
49
Id. at 723-24; see also Ruth Gerber Blumrosen, Remedies for Wage Discrimination, 20 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 99, 102 (1986) (observing that “ordinary Title VII analysis, proof that
the employer segregated women and minorities in low-paying positions would be sufficient
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination”).
50
Brian C. Kalt, Wade H. McCree, Jr., and the Office of the Solicitor General, 1977-1981,
1998 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 703, 709 (noting that “[t]he relative economic
prosperity of the Sixties, which had allowed for the bold liberal social experiments of the
Great Society, had given way to the “stagflation” of the Seventies, which was less conducive
to progressive policy.”

11

however, these decisions expressed ambivalence about efforts to use
antidiscrimination law to address pregnancy and childcare responsibilities – or any
number of other practices that had differential effects on various groups. 51 The
subsequent judicial history has thus been most consistent in applying
antidiscrimination law where the courts conclude both that the employer’s action
obstructs an agreed upon objective (e.g., dismantling segregated workplaces) and
where the differential effect on a protected class is part of a pattern of discriminatory
conduct. They have been most contentious, in contrast, where there is no agreed
upon objective (e.g., accounting for parental responsibilities), even where the
differential effect on a protected class is part of a pattern of conduct that
disproportionately affects women.
The early cases addressing sex discrimination illustrate the tensions. Given
the relatively late addition of the category “sex” to the statute, there was little
legislative history to guide the courts and, in particular, no expression of
Congressional intent with respect to women’s family obligations. 52 The courts,
however, interpreted sex discrimination in much the same way as they interpreted
racial discrimination, that is, as barring explicit barriers to hiring. Thus, the first
U.S. Supreme Court case to interpret Title VII ruled that the law prohibited a sexbased classification that prohibited hiring mothers (though not fathers) with preschool age children, 53 and a subsequent case upheld a prohibition on male and
female want ads against a First Amendment challenge.54 At the same time, however,
the Court rejected efforts to consider different treatment based on pregnancy as a
form of discrimination, leaving the issue to Congress. 55 The Supreme Court of that
era saw pregnancy as a matter of individual choice; 56 it did not treat pregnancy as a
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See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (ruling that Title VII does not include
pregnancy discrimination). Not until 2007 did the EEOC explain how to approach “family
responsibilities discrimination.” EEOC Guidance on Family Responsibilities (2007),
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html#background
52
From the beginning, advocates of this era drew analogies between racial discrimination
and sex discrimination with respect to workplace segregation. See, in particular, Pauli
Murray & Mary O. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 239 (1965) (arguing that sex discrimination, like racial
discrimination, treated women as inferior and creating a caste-like status that justified
occupational segregation and discrimination).
53
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544–45 (1971) (describing the policy as
an explicit gender-based classification).
54
See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (upholding
prohibitions of sex-segregated help-wanted advertisements in the face of a First Amendment
challenge).
55
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded
by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076.
56
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136; Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 489-92 (observing that pregnancy is a
choice, unlike illnesses that constitute similar temporary physical disabilities).
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structural obstacle to women’s workplace access of a kind with the types of barriers
Congress intended Title VII to address. 57
The same dichotomy runs through the courts’ allocation of the burden of
proof.
Once employers moved away from explicitly race or sex-based
classifications, the courts struggled with the question of the proof necessary to
establish discriminatory intent. They became more likely to infer wrongful intent
where the practice itself could be discredited, and more reluctant to do so where the
business practice was treated as presumptively legitimate. 58
In individual cases alleging disparate treatment, the Supreme Court
established a burden-shifting framework that required a “comparator.” 59 In these
cases, courts allowed plaintiffs to prove discrimination where they otherwise lacked
sufficient direct evidence of bias by establishing unequal treatment between two
employees, creating an inference of discrimination if the employer treated the
member of the protected class, such as a woman, less favorably than the employer
treated a comparably situated male employee. 60 The Court emphasized that while a
prospective employee must show that she met the qualifications for the job, Title
VII required “the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment” that discriminated on the basis of race or other impermissible
classifications. 61
The comparator test tied proof of discriminatory motive to assumptions
about segregated workplaces. The foundational case, McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v.
Green, involved a large industrial workplace, with many employees performing
relatively similar duties. 62 The Court assumed that where such an employer
announced an opening, rejected a qualified African-American applicant, kept the
position open, and then hired a similarly qualified white applicant, discriminatory
motive was a reasonable inference. The Court allowed the employer to rebut the
inference through the articulation of a legitimate good faith reason for the rejection
of the African-American applicant. Typically, in these cases, an employer who
could show a practice of interracial hiring had an easier time rebutting the inference
57

At the time Title VII was passed, only 30% of married mothers with children under the age
of 18 were in the labor force. Sharon R. Cohany & Emy Sok, Trends in Labor Participation
by Married Mothers of Infants, MONTHLY LABOR REV. (Feb. 2007),
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2007/02/art2full.pdf. The big increases in women’s labor
force participation would become between 1980 and 2000. Id. at Chart 1. Since then, there
has been much greater commitment to women’s workplace inclusion, and recognition that
full inclusion of women in the workplace requires treating pregnancy and family
responsibilities as matter of workplace structure. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING
GENDER (2000).
58
See infra text at notes 59-93.
59
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
60
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 745-46 (2011).
61
Id. at 801.
62
See id. at 755 (observing that “[t]his system had the potential to work well in the large
industrial workplaces of the manufacturing age Tayloresque workplaces, where multiple
workers engage in tasks that are susceptible to relatively straightforward comparison”).
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than one who maintained an all-white workforce. 63 The ordering of the burden of
proof thus reinforced the presumptive illegitimacy of all-white workplaces and the
rejection of otherwise qualified African-American applicants, tying both to an
inference of discriminatory motive.
Suzanne Goldberg and other scholars have argued that this comparator
requirement does not work terribly well in modern workplaces, which are much less
likely to employ only white males or to have standardized assignments of
responsibility. 64 In the context of employer actions that may be intrinsically
individualized and subjective, the courts have adopted strict requirements for
comparators who can establish the requisite employer intent without more direct
proof of discriminatory motive. 65 While the need for comparators in these terms
limits the ability of antidiscrimination law to reach cases of disparate treatment, the
real problem is the absence of a substantive equality ideal supported by government
mandates 66 – or identification of specific practices with wrongful conduct. Since
employers no longer create entirely white or entirely male workforces, however, the
wrongful conduct is no longer connected to practices such as examinations that were
historically used to exclude protected groups; instead, the determination of when a
business practice is “illegitimate” because it disproportionately affects protected
groups requires reconsideration.
A comparable dichotomy underlies disparate impact law, the second means
the Supreme Court developed for addressing the more subtle forms of
discrimination. Disparate impact analysis differs from disparate treatment cases in
that given sufficient proof that an employment practice has a disparate impact on a
suspected class, no proof of discriminatory intent is necessary. 67
The Supreme Court initially set out the elements of disparate impact
doctrine in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 68 Before Title VII, the Duke Power Company,
headquartered in Charlotte, N.C., “had intentionally segregated its workforce,
63
See, e.g., Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 1997) (observing that the
fact that eighty-eight percent of the work force was comprised of minorities undercut
plaintiff’s claim of discriminatory motive).
64
Goldberg, supra note 60, at 756 (describing “the flexible and dynamic nature of many
contemporary jobs”).
65
See, e.g., Haywood v. Locke, 387 F. App’x 355, 359 (4th Cir. 2010) (“plaintiffs are
required to show that they are similar in all relevant respects to their comparator. . . . Such a
showing would include evidence that the employees ‘dealt with the same supervisor, [were]
subject to the same standards and . . . engaged in the same conduct without such
differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the
employer's treatment of them for it.’”).
66
For example, the courts have always been reluctant to read antidiscrimination provisions
as mandating pregnancy accommodations, however important such accommodations might
be to women’s workforce participation; such accommodation has been viewed as special
treatment rather than equal treatment. See Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination
Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1096, 1101 (2015).
67
Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 705–
06 (2006).
68
401 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1971).
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restricting its African American employees to generally undesirable jobs.” 69 During
the fifties, the company imposed a high school degree requirement for assignment
to the company’s better-paid positions, and after Title VII became effective, it
required those seeking employment or transfers to pass two written examinations.70
Only one of the African-Americans in a position to seek reassignment was a high
school graduate and whites generally outperformed African-Americans on the tests
by three to one. 71 A unanimous Supreme Court found the tests to be discriminatory,
and the case set the paradigm for a successful disparate impact suit. 72 Disparate
impact analysis has been criticized as encouraging employers to create quotas; only
with an integrated workforce can employers insulate themselves from the threat of
litigation. Yet, in the context of workplaces like Duke Power Company with a long
history of discrimination that is exactly what antidiscrimination law sought to
accomplish. 73
Feminists and other antidiscrimination scholars have argued for an
expansion of disparate impact theory to reach a variety of employment practices that
have a differential impact on protected groups. 74 This has been difficult, as Mike
Selmi explains, because the Supreme Court adopted the disparate impact approach
“to deal with specific practices, seniority systems and written tests, that were
perpetuating past intentional discrimination” and that “the reality has been that the
theory has proved an ill fit for any challenge other than to written examinations.” 75
In contrast with the written examination cases, courts routinely reject disparate
impact challenges to “part-time work, light duty requests, and disability policies
based on a failure to accommodate pregnancy.” 76 Indeed, courts do not interpret
Title VII or the Family and Medical Leave Act “to require disturbing core business
practices as a means of eradicating the disadvantage women suffer as a result of their
childbearing and childrearing responsibilities.” 77
Efforts to extend disparate impact doctrine did not succeed for the same
reasons that efforts to extend disparate treatment cases to pregnancy failed. The
69
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1227-29 (4th Cir. 1970) (“Until 1966, no
Negro had ever held a position at [the plant] in any department other than the Labor
Department”).
70
401 U.S. at 427-28
71
Selmi, supra note 67, at 718.
72
Id. at 723-24.
73
See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 67, at 714. This purpose continues to animate disparate impact
cases. In Ward’s Cove Packing v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653, (1989), the Supreme Court
attempted to water down the business necessity standard, complaining that it created an
incentive for employers to adopt quotas. Congress responded by amending Title VII in 1991,
effectively overturning at least parts of Ward Cove. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105
Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2012)). Disparate cases, such as the
firefighters’ litigation in New Haven, continue to address written test requirements that have
a disproportionately exclusionary effect on African-Americans.
74
Selmi, supra note 67, at 704.
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Id. at 795.
76
Id. at 759.
77
Id. at 751.
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question of whether employers must “disturb core business” practices is not one
about impact on women or other protected groups standing in isolation. Instead, it
requires establishing the principle that employers should accommodate any type of
temporary disability for reasons that go beyond the needs of women alone,
identifying pregnant workers with other workers experiencing temporary inability
to lift heavy objects or to stand on their feet for long periods, and building coalitions
rather than emphasizing women’s uniqueness in attempting to win workplace
reforms. 78
The argument for recognition of pregnancy-based discrimination claims
thus became much stronger after Congress amended the ADA to broaden its
coverage to include temporary and minor impairments, including lifting
restrictions. 79 Extending workplace protections for pregnant women requires seeing
such protections not just as a component of discrimination against women, but as
part of a more general effort to require employers to accommodate temporary
disabilities. 80 Such accommodations can be expensive, and they follow from a
conclusion that the employer, rather than the employee or a state insurance fund, is
the right place to impose the cost. Without the principle that employers must
accommodate disabilities,
however, pregnancy accommodations involve
“disturbing (otherwise legitimate) core business practices” 81 or they become what
the Supreme Court termed “most favored employee” status, requiring the extension
of workplace benefits to pregnant women in accordance with the most favorable of
those available to other employees, an approach the Court rejected. 82
We thus identify disability (including pregnancy) accommodation as one
example of “equality law,” that is, the identification of substantive employment
practices inconsistent with a commitment to economic equality, and delegitimization
of these practices as appropriate when applied to any employee. This approach,
however, requires not just examination of the disparate impact on protected groups,
but substantive engagement with the legitimacy of the practice on its own terms and
a vision of what equality (aside from freedom from overt discrimination) means.
The signature accomplishment of feminist scholars – sexual harassment law
– illustrates this approach. Catharine MacKinnon successfully argued that sexual
harassment in the workplace constitutes sex discrimination, and that it should come
within the purview of Title VII. 83 Yet, sexual harassment, once made visible, is
78
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illegitimate as a business practice for reasons that go beyond the impact on its
victims; where it is pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment, it is
also almost always an indication of poor management practices. 84 Thus, a legal
conclusion that it constitutes sex discrimination combines a judgment that it is both
discriminatory and that the impact on women follows from unacceptable conduct.
In this section, we have argued that antidiscrimination doctrine reflects
underlying judgments about the substantive acceptability of workplace practices that
have disparate effects on protected groups. Thus, antidiscrimination law initially
reflected a substantive determination not just to outlaw bias, but to dismantle the
market segmentation that created exclusively white male, black male, white female,
and black female workplaces. In the early days of Title VII, the courts consistently
refined and extended the doctrine where necessary to advance that purpose, thus
making it easier to dismantle white male workplaces such as those at McDonnellDouglas and Duke Power. Since then, when courts have cut back, Congress has
reaffirmed the principle in its amendments to Title VII.
The passage of antidiscrimination law did not, however, involve any
comparable commitment to addressing either the means of advancement within
integrated workplaces or the particular challenges that attend discrimination based
on a failure to respond to (“accommodate”) pregnancy and family responsibilities.
While, as this section has shown, Congress did eventually recognize pregnancy
discrimination as illegal, progress in winning employment structuring to deal with
family responsibilities has occurred most consistently when Congress or the courts
have engaged the underlying legitimacy of the practices, explicitly or implicitly.
Yet, with the waning of the more general efforts to promote economic equality in
the postwar years, substantive engagement with the forces producing economic
inequality has been limited. Legal scholars and other advocates have therefore tried
to extend the antidiscrimination principle to do more of the heavy lifting necessary
to achieve greater equality, but where those efforts have not been combined with a
substantive discussion of the propriety of the practices themselves, the success of
such efforts has been limited. Thus, the courts have been willing to use disparate
impact theory to strike down employment tests where they have the effect of
perpetuating segregated workplaces, which are clearly illegitimate under Title VII.
They have been unwilling, however, to address the failure to provide pregnancy
accommodations in the absence of either a more general requirement to include
pregnant women in the workplace or to accommodate all temporary physical
limitations. The distinction is not really about “disparate impact” – both sets of
policies have a disparate impact on certain groups. Instead, it involves a substantive
conception of the employer responsibility to promote equality – and of the
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E.g., Mike Isaac, Inside Uber’s Aggressive, Unrestrained Workplace Culture, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/technology/uber-workplaceculture.html; Valentina Zarya, In the Fight Against Sexual Harassment, Money Trumps
Morals, FORTUNE (June 21, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/06/21/uber-kalanick-resigns/.

17

substantive propriety of the business practices that pose obstacles to full inclusion
in the workplace.
C. The Story of Title VII’s Success
The antidiscrimination laws of the sixties have been successful in reducing
gender and race-based inequality by opening what had previously been exclusively
white male positions to women and minorities. 85 In the first decade following
adoption of Title VII, African-Americans moved into positions that had been closed
to them, with corresponding gains in income. 86 During that decade, women
increased their workforce participation to a greater degree than other workers, but
did so overwhelmingly in the growing number of predominately female clerical and
service positions, and saw no substantial income gains vis-à-vis white men. 87 The
major advances for women would come instead during the eighties as women
increased their educational levels and moved into the professions. 88
Both minority gains in the sixties and seventies, and women’s gains in the
eighties 89 vindicated the assumptions associated with the passage of
antidiscrimination laws. 90 These laws opened up the “limited portals of entry” into
good jobs, allowed those who made it through the door to participate in the career
ladders available once inside, and did so without necessarily undercutting the wages
of the white men who worked beside them. 91 These assumptions all began to give
way with the changing nature of workplaces.
By the end of the seventies, an assault began on the unionized workplaces
that had produced the relative income equality and seniority based-advancement of
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the post-war era. 92 Much greater income inequality, among white males as well as
in the economy more generally, became the norm. And as the economy changed,
judges grappled with the question of the underlying meaning of antidiscrimination
law: did it simply mandate equal treatment, dismantling the racial and gender
classifications of earlier eras that limited access to “ports of entry,” 93 or could it be
extended to address the new forms of subordination women and minorities
continued to face within the organizations to which they had gained entry? Before
examining courts’ response, we turn to an analysis of how corporate law and
practices facilitate gender discrimination in the contemporary economy.
II. COMPETITION AND GENDER IN THE NEW ECONOMY
When Congress enacted Title VII, it saw segregated workplaces as an
impediment to racial and gender equality and an obstacle to further economic
growth. Today, formal segregation has been dismantled, and women and minorities
enjoy much greater access to the entry-level positions of the new economy. Yet, the
source of economic inequality and of racial and gender disparities has changed,
creating new challenges for antidiscrimination law, economic productivity, and
societal equality.
Central to these changes is the transformation of the means of advancement
in the highly paid tiers of the new economy. Women have won access to jobs as
prison guards and men can be flight attendants, 94 but gaining a foothold into entrylevel jobs does not ensure security or advancement. Instead, advancement depends
to a much greater extent on competition and individualism, with management
structures designed to reward such behavior. 95
As other scholars have argued, the law’s failure to keep up with the
structural changes in the workplace has undermined the effectiveness of
antidiscrimination efforts. 96 They link antidiscrimination law’s failings to two
factors that have changed the nature of career advancement: the greater role of
flexible and subjective workplace interactions in determining raises, promotions and
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bonuses and the persistence of subtle or unconscious biases that reinforce gender
stereotyping. 97
Missing from their explanations, however, is an examination of the forces
that drive the selection process and the supposedly unconscious biases. Their
accounts suggest that accurate evaluations of individual employees would eliminate
the disparities – but do not consider why gender disparities not only persist, but have
in many cases increased most in the parts of the economy that have enjoyed that the
greatest income growth. It is only with this understanding that a new “equality law”
that seeks to address these structural forces can be envisioned and that Title VII can
remain effective. In this section, we analyze how the new economy has a disparate
impact on women, the first step in moving towards a reconceptualization of the
interaction between structural inequality and antidiscrimination law.
Section A explains how the structure of workforces has changed to
emphasize competition and individualism. Section B documents how these changes
have produced a shift in the gendered wage gap, with the greatest disparities now
occurring in a relatively few places in the economy – those that have produced large
income disparities. Section C uses the analysis of the new economy to explain the
gender gap. It proposes that gender disparities have increased as women are subject
to a reinforcing triple bind: they are less attracted to these competitive workplaces;
they are perceived as less able to compete on the terms of the economy; and they are
disproportionately penalized for displaying the same competitive traits the men
demonstrate, reinforcing the disinclination to apply for the most competitive
environments.
A. Valorizing the Tournament
When Congress passed Title VII, large employers organized workers into a
system of tiers that made it relatively easy to base antidiscrimination litigation on
use of comparators demonstrating disparate treatment of otherwise similarly situated
employees. A workplace based on tiers creates pyramid-like systems of employee
relationships that encourage employees within each tier to identify with each other
and, assuming stable employment, with the institution itself. 98 Many of the largest
employers were manufacturers, union membership was high, 99 and workers at all
levels of income experienced similar growth. 100 Moreover, even within managerial
97
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ranks, employees tended to be promoted from below, and they identified with
company rather than individualistic aims. 101 Monetary incentives were modest, if
they existed at all, and corporate teams constrained self-interested behavior that did
not serve the collective interests of the group. 102 The company “man” took with him
the status that came from association with a successful company; 103 he had little
ability to cash in and leave for greener pastures.104
In contrast, the new system of steeply banked hierarchies encourages top
management to identify more with shareholders than with their subordinates,
employees to compete against each other, and both groups to focus on short term
individual advancement rather than longer term institutional health. Consequently,
the “employers' compact” with workers has changed, providing much less
protection. 105 Executive compensation has become much more variable, and those
enjoying the greatest gains do so in ways that have become more portable 106 Within
this system, it may make (personal, even if not institutional) sense for executives to
adopt practices that advance short term objectives even if the process undermines
the company’s long term institutional health. 107
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The new system involves three mutually reinforcing practices. First, the
managerial system has been replaced with a system that promotes “shareholder
primacy,” 108 thereby changing the institutional focus of publicly traded corporations
away from the long term interests of the institutions and toward the short-term
interests of shareholders. 109 “Short-termism” 110 separates the interests of
shareholders and executives from those of other corporate constituents such as
employees and customers. 111 It also undermines the link between institutions and
investment in the future, as corporate officers focus to a greater degree on immediate
payoffs, and less on investment in either employee training or research with longer
term payoffs. 112 A 2005 survey of 401 financial executives, for example, reported
that an overwhelming majority (78%) would take actions that lowered the value of
their companies to create a smooth earnings stream. 113 More than 80% of the
respondents further stated that they would decrease spending on advertising,
maintenance, and research and development expenses to meet short-term objectives
such earnings targets. 114 Another study, which looked at 6,642 companies in a
variety of industries during the period from 1986 to 2005, similarly found an
emphasis on short-termism: the firms increased reported earnings, which in turn
influence stock prices, by cutting support for research and development and

making in favor of activities that increase short term profits even at the expense of the
company's survival.”).
108
Lynn Stout describes shareholder primary as an “ideology” that “led to a number of
individually modest but collectively significant changes in corporate law and practice that
had the practical effect of driving directors and executives in public corporations to focus on
share price as their guiding star.” Stout, supra note 9, at 1177–78. While this dogma
increased the emphasis on share price as the principal measure of company (and thus
executive) success, it also had the effect of increasing CEO power vis-à-vis other company
stakeholders such as employers. See William K. Black & June Carbone, Economic Ideology
and the Rise of the Firm as a Criminal Enterprise, 49 AKRON L. REV. 371, 397, n. 155 (2016).
And since it does not necessarily promote long term institutional health, it is not necessarily
in the interests of the interests of all shareholders. See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the
Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 320-21 (2012).
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marketing, even where such practices did not advance the firms’ medium to longer
term interests. 115
Within this system, executive compensation has become exponentially
higher and more steeply banked in the upper management ranks in an effort to align
executive and shareholder interests. The increase in the ratio of chief executive
officer compensation to average worker pay, for example, went from twenty in 1965
to 331 in 2013. 116 The principle component of executive compensation takes the
form of stock options, which increase in value with quarterly earnings, which in turn
influence share price in publically traded companies. 117 Moreover, corporate
boards, which have become more influential, emphasize share value as a measure of
CEO success, 118 while hedge funds and other activist investors target what they
perceive to be underperforming firms. 119 The result creates powerful incentives that
separate the interests of CEOs and shareholders from other corporate stakeholders.
Second, this emphasis on the CEO’s need to produce immediate results has
contributed to the adoption of merit pay and bonus systems that rank employees and
introduce greater pay variations among employees at comparable levels of an
organization. These incentive systems allow a CEO to reorient a firm’s priorities, 120
rewarding employees who quickly adopt management aims, even if such objectives
are ill-considered or at odds with the company’s established ethos or ethical
standards. 121 The incentive systems may employ subjective evaluations that
115
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increase management discretion or reductionist ones tied to easily measured factors
such as sales or unit profitability. 122 Perhaps the most notorious of these evaluation
systems is “rank and yank,” a system Jack Welch initially introduced at General
Electric, and the type of system at the core of the Microsoft litigation. 123 The “yank”
part of the system, which seeks to repeatedly cull low performing employees, has
received the sharpest criticism, and many companies have abandoned it, although
they have retained ranking in some form. 124 Yet, the ranking part of the system has
negative effects even if the company does not seek to fire or replace employees.
Lynne Dallas observes that systems that use rankings to justify large disparities in
compensation tend to produce greater emphasis on self-interest, higher levels of
distrust that undermine teamwork, greater homogeneity in the selection of corporate
management, less managerial accountability and more politicized decisionmaking. 125 In short, supposedly meritocratic bonus systems have been found to
replicate many of the attributes of “old boys clubs” that protect insiders at the
expense of outsiders. 126
Third, these changes in corporate orientation alter the qualities that lead to
career advancement. The modern CEO selection process prizes the “charismatic”
leader, who is seen as having “the power to perform miracles – to bring a dying
company back to life, for instance, or to vanquish much larger, more powerful
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 37 (2003) (describing how Enron management using its bonus system to
reorient company behavior in counterproductive ways).
122
Both, for example, have led to greater gender disparities in doctor’s compensation. Where
reductionist measures are used, such as the number of Medicare procedures billed, male
doctors tend to bill more procedures than female doctors do, in part because male doctors
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Do: Medicare’s Doctor Gender Pay Gap, NERDWALLET (Apr. 22, 2014),
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foes.” 127 As companies place greater confidence in the external executive market,
they also invest less in their own managers, and increase the emphasis on lateral
hires at more junior levels as well. 128 The ability to move in turn becomes necessary
to upward advancement. And the ability to move drives up the wages of the mobile
and creates incentives to look out for self-interest rather than invest in the
company. 129 This further redefines the qualities associated with the ideal executive
who can impress in an interview and the process that determines compensation, as a
larger part of overall compensation depends on negotiated salaries or annual
bonuses. 130 Moreover, it builds in rewards for those who can have an immediate
impact and then move on to the next position. Loyalty to an institution no longer
matters. 131
The financial sector, whose influence has also disproportionately grown
with these changes, 132 has shifted toward such norms at least as dramatically if not
more than other companies have. Michael Lewis, for example, in his 1989 book
about Salomon Brothers, Liar’s Poker, wrote about the celebration of the “big
swinging dick.” 133 He described his well-paid class of traders, hired right out of Ivy
League colleges, as acting “more like students in a junior high school.” 134 The ethos,
as the name big swinging dick suggests, combined a glorification of cleverness and
gamesmanship with signs of masculinity; 135 serving customer interests was not part
of the path toward advancement. 136 The change came not only with the switch from
127
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partnership to corporate form in Wall Street firms, 137 but with the ability to create
complex, opaque financial products– and to profit from them at the expense of less
sophisticated customers. 138 Potential clients, who were often at the losing ends of
the trades, nonetheless sought to be associated with the winners of these high stakes
status competitions. 139
The changes within professions have been less dramatic, but they are not
immune from the tournament mentality: big law firms have become more like
businesses, 140 and differences in doctors’ compensation have also become more
variable. 141
Taken together, these changes create more hierarchical and variable
compensation systems; no two employees in a company may necessarily earn the
same salary, with disparities increasing as one climbs the management ladder. 142 In
addition, they often change corporate workplaces that once prized loyalty and
teamwork into competitive contests that pit workers against each other, and turn the
executives who emerge from the process into “hyper-motivated survivors” of the
contest-like evaluation process. 143 The system rewards those who put their own
interests ahead of the group and who focus more on immediate financial rewards
than on either a service orientation or the institution’s long-term interests. 144 The
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new system is responsible for the shift from the pyramid structure of compensation
in the manufacturing age to a more steeply banked system in which those at the top
earn dramatically more than anyone else does. While this new system arguably
disadvantages the majority of workers at the expense of the few, it also imperils the
gains women have made in the workforce and will undermine their position even
more in the future.
B. The New Economy and the Gender Wage Gap
The changing workplace has created dramatically greater income inequality
in American society, with increasing concern about the staggering increases in top
salaries, compression at the bottom, and the hollowing out of the middle class. 145
The subject of much less commentary, however, has been the impact on women.
They have lost ground in the areas of the economy where incomes have increased
most.
Looking at overall measures of the gendered gap in income would seem to
tell a story of progress; that gap has narrowed substantially over the last half century.
Yet, as a measure of women’s economic standing, the composite numbers are
misleading. While the wage gap has narrowed, it has done so overwhelmingly at
the bottom, in part because of the drop in blue collar male wages. 146 Since 1990,
the gendered wage gap has grown where it matters most – at the top. In 1990, the
gendered gap in wages did not vary much by education; to the extent that there was
a difference, college graduate women earned a slightly higher percentage of the male
wage than less educated women. 147 Today, that relationship has reversed; the
percentage of the male wage that female college graduates earns has declined, while
it has increased for all other women. 148
This is precisely where there has been the most substantial growth in income
inequality in the United States. Between 2000 and 2014, weekly wages for the top
10% of the workforce rose by 9.7%, the place where women had “lost substantial
ground,” while falling 3.7% for workers in the lowest tenth of the earnings
distribution, and 3% for those in the lowest quarter. 149
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The most dramatic changes in income were at the absolute top, the place
where women are the least represented.150
By 2014, total average CEO
compensation for the largest firms had reached $16.3 million. 151 These increases in
compensation between the late seventies and 2014 constituted an increase of 997%,
double the increase in the stock market and the 10.9% growth in average
compensation over the same period. 152 Women’s representation in these ranks has
remained small. Although women constitute almost half of all workers, they are
only 4% of the CEOs of Fortune 500 Companies, 153 “8.1% of the country's top
earners,” and only 14-16% “of corporate executive officers, law firm equity partners,
and senior management in Silicon Valley.”154 Even if they make it into the CEO
ranks, the women “earn 46% less than their male counterparts, after adjusting for
age and education.” 155
The financial sector exhibits a similar pattern of disproportionate increase
in compensation and a widening gender gap. In the post-war era, compensation in
the financial sector increased in step with other industries, 156 while between 1982
and 2007 average annual compensation in the financial sector doubled at a time
when compensation in the rest of the economy grew only modestly. 157 Yet, the
financial sector shows greater gender disparities than anywhere else: an analysis of
personal financial advisors, for example, shows that women earn 58.4 cents on the
dollar compared to men, a larger gap than among men when the same measurements
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are used 158 and other surveys find similar gaps among insurance agents, security
sales agents, financial managers, and clerks. 159 Moreover, as compensation within
the financial sector soared, the representation of women has declined. During the
nineties, women initially won access to key financial jobs through litigation, but
despite increasing numbers of female M.B.A.s, their numbers on Wall Street
dropped after 2000, 160 as did their representation in venture capital firms like Kleiner
Perkins. 161
Outside of these top positions, incomes – and gender disparities – have also
steadily risen in the professional and managerial positions that command the highest
salaries – and that tend to be the most competitive.162 For example, following the
financial sector positions, the next highest disparities tend to come for marketing
and sales managers, who are often paid on commission, where it is 65.8%, followed
by physicians and surgeons, 71.0, management analysts 74.9, and lawyers 77.1. 163
Doctors provide a particularly puzzling example because gender gaps have
grown not only in total income, 164 but also in starting salaries, even after controlling
for education, specialty, and hours worked. 165 As with other positions, the
disparities among doctors tend to be the highest in the most profitable specialties,
such as orthopedic surgery and among other surgical subspecialties. 166 Moreover,
gender differences are greatest in the markets, such as Charlotte, S.C., that have the
highest average levels of physician pay, replicating the patterns in other industries
of the highest gender gaps in the most lucrative jobs. 167 In addition, studies find
158
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gender disparities where compensation is based on subjective evaluations or
reductionist measures of procedures billed. 168
Among lawyers, overall pay has increased since 1990 in accordance with a
double-humped system in which the compensation of top law firm partners grew
substantially while other lawyers saw more modest increases in salaries. 169 While
there is a gender wage gap of 22.9% among female and male lawyers as a whole,
among partners in the largest firms, there is a 44% differential in pay. 170 As is true
of other highly paid sectors, the gender gap is highest at the high end of the pay
scale.
In light of the increasing gender pay differences in the sectors of the
economy that have contributed the most to growing inequality, the question is
whether antidiscrimination law can address these differences. The answer involves
further examination of the shift to more negative sum competitions and individualist
employment environments.
C. The New System of Negative Competition and Gender
Most analyses of the “glass ceiling” that blocks the movement of women
into upper management positions focus on ways to ensure the promotion of women
on the same terms that apply to the men. 171 Such an approach to gender
discrimination focuses on the seeming neutrality of the more competitive
marketplace, thus placing its impact outside of the scope of Title VII law.
Instead, this section shows that the more general forces that produce the new
marketplace – and greater economic inequality – are deeply gendered, and are thus
subject to challenge under Title VII. Yet, antidiscrimination efforts, which decry
the gender disparities, have not directly engaged the validity of the practices
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focused on the bottom line, perform more procedures and see more patients. Fitch, supra
note 122.
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associated with greater inequality (winner take all bonus systems, short-termism,
and highly competitive workplaces). It is the separation of the two that intrinsically
limits the effectiveness of antidiscrimination approaches.
This section begins by examining the gendered impact of the shift toward
more competitive workplaces, second, explores the impact on the qualities
associated with the winners of such competitions, and third, considers the negative
evaluation of women in such environments. This means that women face a triple,
not just a double, bind. 172
1. Selection Effects Part I: Gender Differences in Competitive Environments
The primary question for purposes of the intersection between antiinequality and antidiscrimination law is accounting for the growth of gender
disparities in the highest-paid professions. Almost all of the accounts, whether they
view these changes as pernicious or benign, 173 emphasize that as differences in
compensation have become more extreme, the competition for top jobs has
increased, 174 and that increased competition produces greater gender differences. 175
This section considers why simply increasing the level of competition to get, keep
and prosper from these jobs may have gendered effects.
The conventional explanation for the disproportionate lack of women in the
highest earning sector in the economy is that women are less likely to apply because
of the emphasis on long hours, greater risk and even differences in taste for
competition. Each of these explanations may have a degree of plausibility; but each
also cloaks the artificial nature of the competitions that have been created. These
competitions often discourage women from applying not because they involve
competition per se, but because the competitions valorize stereotypically male traits
associated with the promotion of self-interest at the expense of collaboration. 176
172
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The emphasis on male-defined competition then produces self-reinforcing effects
that create even less supportive environments for women. Women who accurately
perceive that they will not be treated fairly in such environments – or may not wish
to work in such environments even if they are welcomed – become that much less
likely to apply. 177
First, when it comes to working longer hours, 178 women, particularly those
with young children, often do not apply. 179 Longer hours certainly provide part of
the answer. 180
As the economy has shifted toward more winner-take-all
compensation systems, part of the competition has taken the form of hours – and the
longer the hours, the more women tend to drop out of the competition. 181 Hours
have in fact increased, and they have increased most at the top of the income
ladder. 182 During the Great Compression from the forties through the seventies,
blue-collar workers and white-collar workers worked about the same number of
hours. 183 Today, the highest earning employees work much longer hours than the
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average worker does. 184 Women still bear disproportionate responsibility for child
care, 185 and when women’s hours exceed 45 hours a week, it undermines their
relationships. 186 Elite men continue to be more likely to earn more than their wives
to a greater degree than other working couples, increasing the pressure on high
income wives to cut back,. 187 These are, of course, so much more than just private
choices. Indeed, Wisconsin repealed its Equal Pay Act, with a state senator who
backed the measure insisting that men and women have different goals in life and
money “is more important for men” while women refuse to work 50 or 60 hours a
week because of their greater involvement in childrearing. 188
An actual job-based need to work longer hours, however, cannot provide the
entire answer for increasing gender disparities in top positions. For one thing,
gender disparities persist even when researchers examined only white college
graduates with fifteen years of experience who worked fulltime. 189 The long hours
themselves may reflect more competitive environments rather than increased
productivity. 190 In addition, managers cannot necessarily tell whether workers who
claim to work longer hours are in fact doing so, and one study found that men were
three times more likely than women to ease up on hours without having it effect their
performance reviews; in short, they were more likely to “pass” as workaholics. 191
Consequently, while long hours do affect gender disparities, the longer hours may
reflect increased competition as much if not more than workplace needs.
Numerous management studies focus on other gender differences in
corporate advancement. Some suggest, for example, that women are more risk
averse than men or that they lack the confidence (some would say hubris) that comes
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from success. 192 These studies, however, have been subject to withering criticism 193
and do not necessarily take context into account: male and female entrepreneurs and
managers, for example, do not vary in risk propensities or in their success in
managing risk. 194
Many social science explanations focus on the taste for competition itself.
In fact, almost all studies show that higher pay tied to performance measures and
wants ads emphasizing competitive environments increase the percentage of men
who apply. 195 Laboratory studies using a general population indicate that the effect
of competition on gender-based preferences may be independent of the individual’s
orientation toward risk or confidence in her performance. 196 For example, when
given a choice between performing a task on a non-competitive piece-rate basis
versus in a contest, 73% of the men selected the contest, while only 35% of the
women did so. 197 Yet, these studies do not necessarily take the level and type of
competition into account. For example, some studies distinguish between
“hypercompetitives,” who strive for domination and control over others, versus
“personal development competitors,” who are concerned with the feelings and
welfare of others. 198
Nonetheless, these differences in preferences, whatever their sources, can
affect the gender composition of workplaces. Advertising that emphasizes
competitive traits, for example, tends to increase the percentage of male applicants,
199
and the greater percentage of men may make the environments less attractive to
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women for reasons that go beyond a taste for competition. 200 Some workplaces may
deliberately manipulate the perception of competitiveness to increase employee
insecurity and alignment with company objectives; other positions such as those
involved with commission sales may have long been designed in such terms. 201
Both tend to result in fewer women applying. 202
In short, these “choices” by women not to engage in competition or apply
for particular jobs are choices made within particular contexts. Creating bonus
systems with large wage disparities tends to attract not only those more drawn to
money, but workers who are less likely to be supportive of colleagues.203 Employers
who emphasize the competitive nature of such positions can expect to attract more
men than women, 204 but they are also signaling that they will tolerate certain types
of behavior that may disadvantage women, such as in-group favoritism or lack of
mentoring. 205 The emphasis on long hours then challenges women who make
choices under the constraints of familial responsibilities (which in turn become
employer-enforced stereotypes). 206 Moreover, these workplaces will “crowd out”
values such as concern for others or adherence to ethical principles that many women
(and men) might prefer. 207
Accordingly, these are choices that are steered by the ways employers
structure 208 and advertise 209 jobs, and choices made when women know their actions
200
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will be viewed differently than men’s. 210 The result is a set of cascade effects.
CEOs may make workplaces more competitive as a way to achieve short-term goals.
Doing so tends to attract more men than women. The shift in workplace composition
can then have reinforcing effects, defining the nature of the competition in
stereotypical male terms and, as we will show below, accurately persuading women
that they will be less likely to succeed.
2. Selection Effects Part II: The Redefinition of the Company “Man”
The change from career ladders and the “company man” to competitive
contests involves a shift from technocratic managers to “leaders.” 211 A large
management literature describes the importance of assertive executives, who have
confidence in their vision for a company, the ability to inspire others, and the
determination to implement it whatever obstacles get in the way. 212 This same
literature, however, recognizes that leaders who possess such traits are also likely to
suffer from hubris, lack of empathy, and the willingness to cut corners. 213 Indeed,
Larry Ribstein described the tournament survivors as “Machiavellian, narcissistic,
prevaricating, pathologically optimistic, free from self-doubt and moral distractions,
willing to take great risk as the company moves up and to lie when things turn
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bad.” 214 Like Ribstein, both management supporters and their critics label this
collection of traits “narcissistic” 215 – and as stereotypically male. 216
What these changes in both finance and upper management do is to place an
emphasis on stereotypically male leadership traits, defining the ideal traits in
gendered terms. The result rewards those perceived to possess such traits and
minimizes the downside associated with them. 217 This creates a set of reinforcing
effects that aggravates gender disparities.
First, leadership has been defined in terms of traits such as energy,
dominance, self-confidence and charisma that are associated with narcissism, and
narcissists are both more likely to apply for and be selected for such positions. 218
Second, men are more likely to be identified with such traits. 219
Psychological studies show that while both men and women display such traits, men
do so to a much greater degree than women. 220 Moreover, in looking only at
narcissists, researchers found that men were more likely than women to desire power
and to be attracted to positions that promised money, status and authority. Indeed,
the single largest gender difference the researchers found was in the willingness to
demand greater rewards for themselves, and to use greater status to exploit others.221
214
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Third, the selection of top management for their narcissistic qualities is also
selection for those who will be more inclined to see compensation as a measure of
merit, to feel that the compensation they received is justified, and to use whatever
tactics they have at their disposal to increase their leverage in negotiations. 222 A
study of tech firms found that the more narcissistic CEOs, rated in accordance with
an employee evaluation of personality traits, received “more total direct
compensation (salary, bonus, and stock options), have more money in their total
shareholdings, and have larger discrepancies between their own (higher)
compensation and the other members of their team.” 223
In short, the selection for narcissistic traits favors men who are more likely
than women are to desire power, to be attracted to positions that promised money,
status and authority, to be willing to demand greater rewards for themselves, and to
use greater status to exploit others.
3. Selection Effect Part III: Gender and “Sharp Elbows” 224
While the valorization of narcissistic traits often leads to the willingness to
overlook many of the negative traits associated with it, women do not benefit to the
same degree from the expression of these traits nor escape scrutiny to the same
extent as the men. At the same time, neither do they receive as much benefit as they
might otherwise from stereotypically female management traits, which may pay off
for companies in different – or better – ways.
The antidiscrimination literature has long shown that women are in a double
bind with respect to traditionally masculine and aggressive tactics. If women do
display “elbows” (as did Ellen Pao), they are judged harshly for not conforming to
gender stereotypes—but if they do not, they may be viewed as lacking in leadership
potential. 225 The association of the more positive narcissistic traits such as
others, see HILL & PAINTER, supra note 12, at 123-24 (2015) (describing such traits in the
financial sector). This may go beyond narcissism to psychopathy. Tom Loftus, What Your
CEO Is Reading: My CEO, My Psychopath; Hwy. 101 Road Rage; Reengineering for Women
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“motivation to lead, desire for authority, and self-perceived leadership ability” with
men tends to reinforce what may be subconscious gender stereotypes. 226 At the same
time, women tend to be criticized for deviation from expected feminine roles even
when they display the more positive traits 227 and punished more severely than men
for the more negative traits associated with narcissism, such as self-entitlement and
willingness to exploit others. 228 Women at Amazon, for example, attribute the lack
of a single woman on the company’s top leadership team to its competitive
evaluation system. Sounding much like Ellen Pao, they believed that they could lose
out in promotions because of intangible criteria like the failure to “earn trust” or
disagreeing with colleagues. 229 “Being too forceful, they said, can be particularly
hazardous for women in the workplace.” 230
This traditional double bind further influences the negotiations that have
become a much greater factor in determining higher end salaries. If women fail to
negotiate or to press hard in negotiations, they fall behind in salaries with potentially
career long consequences. At the same time, employers are more likely to view
women than men negotiating aggressively, especially in negotiations without clear
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standards for the results. 231 And even if they do negotiate at the same rate as men,
they are less likely to receive promotions. 232
In industries that reward taking risks by breaking the rules and hoping to get
away with it, the double bind may be particularly pernicious. A study of the financial
industry demonstrates, for example, that misconduct is prevalent: “roughly one in
thirteen financial advisers in the U.S. has a record of misconduct.”233 Gender
differences in the misconduct are rife. Men are three times as likely to engage in
misconduct, twice as likely to be repeat offenders, and commit offenses that turn out
to be 20% costlier to their employers. 234 Yet, once misconduct is reported, the
women are 20% more likely to lose their jobs and 30% less likely to find new ones
compared to the men. 235 These patterns correspond with the representation of
women in senior management; “firms in which males comprise a greater percentage
of executives/owners are more likely to punish female advisers more severely and
hire fewer females with a record of past misconduct.” 236 In an industry in which
misconduct charges are frequent and risk-taking includes a willingness to break the
rules, the stakes for women in getting caught are substantially greater. 237
Given these practices, it is hardly surprising that fewer women apply to these
positions. What some men may perceive as an opportunity to thrive in a competitive
environment, many women may see a “heads I win, tails you lose game” in which
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they may be less likely to enjoy the benefits of outsized risks, but more likely to
experience their negative consequences.238

***
Large companies today rely heavily today on pay for performance systems,
with competitive evaluations that rank employees. 239 Managers often introduce such
systems to shake up an organization, reorient it toward new management objectives,
or prepare for layoffs. 240 The systems, even when they strive to be objective, are
subject to favoritism and gamesmanship. 241 Such workplaces encourage “unethical
behavior, since some individuals are willing to pay to improve their rank by
sabotaging others’ work or by increasing artificially their own relative
performance.” 242 And there is no evidence they improve performance. Yet, they
remain entrenched partly because competition, rankings and bonuses have become
associated with standard management norms and are self-reinforcing while
entrenching double-bind detriments 243 and partly because they do deliver short term
238
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239
Enron, for example, used the “rank and yank” performance management system initially
developed at GE to rank their employees and then terminate the bottom 10%. This created
an uncomfortably competitive corporate ethos that made workers rationalize their illegal
conduct as successful business practices. See, e.g., PETER C. FUSARO & ROSS M. MILLER,
WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON 51-52 (2002); see also Nancy B. Rapoport, “Nudging”
Better Lawyer Behavior: Using Default Rules and Incentives to Change Behavior in Law
Firms, 4 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 42, 42 n.2 (2014) (“Want people to turn on
their colleagues rather than encourage teamwork? Use a ‘rank and yank’ system that
routinely drops the bottom 10% of high achievers off the payroll”).
240
Steve Bates, Forced Rankling, HR MAG. (June 1, 2003), https://www.shrm.org/hrtoday/news/hr-magazine/pages/0603bates.aspx.
241
Id.
242
Gary Charness, David Masclet, & Marie Claire Villeval, The Dark Side of Competition
for Status, 60 MGMT. SCI. 38, 42 (2014).
243
See, e.g., Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87 (1999)
(observing that “(ostensibly) independent decisions, might repeatedly ignore their own
inclinations, preferring instead to emulate their predecessors. More specifically, the cascades
literature posits that strategic actors may rationally prefer emulation, presuming (frequently
incorrectly) that their own information is unreliable measured against the stock of that
revealed from their predecessors' actions.”) For an example of this in the sex stereotyping
literature, see Case, supra note 204, at 86-7, describing the report of a commission
examining police practices:
The Commission reported that while female officers' greater tendency to
manifest feminine and avoid masculine behaviors actually caused them to
outperform male officers, the stereotypical expectation of male officers

41

pay-offs to ambitious CEOs. 244 Even if a growing literature documents the long
term disadvantages of these practices, companies focused on the short terms may
have little incentive to change.
At the same time, the emphasis on individual rather than institutional
advancement often crowds out other values 245 and undermines the importance of
what women do well. Stereotypically female leadership styles are more associated
with transformational approaches that take group cohesion into account rather than
transactional approaches that focus only on the bottom line, and the management
literature finds that such leadership delivers more successful results. 246 Yet, these
qualities are less rewarded in the competitive environments such as those in tech and
finance that offer the highest rates of compensation.
Further compounding these results is the fact that women are often less
geographically mobile then men, and thus more likely to invest in job specific traits
rather than preparation for the next move. 247 Yet, modern workplaces, with their
emphasis on landing rising stars rather than on investing in their own, provide

that policing called for masculine traits and that female officers lacked
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greater rewards for those willing to move, both within institutions and to new
positions elsewhere. 248
Overall, these shifts in corporate culture have deeply gendered effects. 249
Qualities such as the emphasis on competition rather than cooperation, individual
rather than group interests, and short-term rather than longer term or more holistic
aims correspond to well-documented gender disparities. 250 The more sophisticated
studies show that the disparities tend to be less about capacity and performance, and
more about stereotypical assumptions about leadership. 251 The “tournament” tends
to attract those most “willing to take great risk as the company moves up and to lie
when things turn bad.” 252 The fact that the characteristics associated with these
positions tend to be gendered ones further encourages stereotyped evaluations of
employee performance, 253 with reinforcing effects as women become even less
likely to apply or to succeed if they are hired.
Antidiscrimination law, in its current incarnation, is ill-equipped to deal
with these background business incentives that promote inequality.
III. RESTRUCTURING ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
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The history of antidiscrimination law shows that it sought to combat not just
individual instances of discrimination, but structural factors that had created whitemale-only “good” jobs and segregated “bad” jobs dominated by African-Americans,
women, or other minorities. In doing so, antidiscrimination law both depended on
earlier equality enhancing measures, such as unionization, 254 and focused new
scrutiny on other practices, such as sexual harassment or qualification tests that had
been previously treated as routine workplace practices. In many cases, the practices,
which were initially viewed as routine, became hard to justify once subject to
scrutiny that showed both disparate impact on the basis of factors such as race and
gender and the lack of workplace justifications.
In today’s economy, courts have similarly viewed the shift toward winnertake-all compensation systems and the negative-sum competitive mindset in
management and finance as routine and outside the appropriate ambit of judicial
scrutiny in antidiscrimination suits. So long as they do, individual cases like Ellen
Pao’s cannot address the systemic factors that underlie such cases; her case simply
amounts to a claim that Kleiner-Perkins should welcome women with sharp elbows
alongside the men. 255
This section looks at the ability of antidiscrimination to address the systemic
practices. First, it shows how existing disparate treatment law is ill-suited to address
the interconnections between individual employee evaluations and the shift in
business cultures. Second, it considers the degree to which cases like Microsoft, that
use discrimination law to challenge the practices themselves, can be more effective.
This section concludes that where companies adopt competitive evaluation
schemes associated with increased executive compensation and gender disparities,
and where these systems do not correspond to evidence of increased firm
performance, such practices should be subject to greater judicial scrutiny. The form
that scrutiny takes will depend on the nature of the individual case, but it will only
fit into Title VII through an approach that engages the substantive legitimacy of the
practices. The conclusion suggests that the most effective approaches, however,
combine antidiscrimination efforts with substantive reforms designed to address the
practices.
A. The Limited Reach of Current Antidiscrimination Doctrine
Anti-discrimination scholars correctly observe that the law has failed to
keep up as workforces have changed from narrow portals of entry and lockstep
career ladders to easier entry into unskilled positions and more subjective and
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individualized pathways to advancement. 256 As these theorists argue, proving that
an employer has treated an individual employee unfairly because of sex
discrimination has become increasingly difficult. 257
Ellen Pao’s case provides an example of the limitations of Title VII as a
check on the determinations made within such as a system when the case is framed
solely as one of unequal treatment of an individual woman in accordance with the
ordinary norms of a competitive workplace. 258 Her case generated attention to the
lack of women in venture capital firms, but Pao’s lawsuit took the Kleiner Perkins
evaluation system as a given and argued that she was unfairly evaluated in
accordance with it. This type of case poses intrinsic limitations: such individual
cases do not fundamentally challenge the nature of the competition that underlies
the system.
Some scholars argue that Title VII was never intended to deal with either
the type of evaluation system a firm uses or the business decisions made under
them. 259 A principal part of Pao’s case, for example, involved the firm’s decision
not to sponsor her proposed investment in Twitter in 2007, at the very beginning of
the social media era. Kleiner Perkins showed interest in Twitter only when a male
employee proposed it in 2010, well after other venture capital firms had gotten in on
the early funding rounds. 260 Yet, relying on hindsight to show that a firm passed up
what turned out to be an incredibly lucrative investment because of gender bias is
intrinsically difficult.
Moreover, disparate treatment is hard to prove without a comparator, and
exact comparators are hard to find in individual cases. The prima facie case model
for contemporary antidiscrimination law relies principally on comparison evidence
demonstrating that an employer treated a plaintiff less favorably than a similar
256
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worker from a different group, because of a protected characteristic. 261 Among top
level and professional jobs, there may simply be no one else in a small unit. 262 Even
among middle management positions there may be no one who performs the same
duties. 263 In an Equal Pay Act case, a federal trial court observed that:
These are Senior Vice Presidents in charge of different aspects of
Defendant's operations; these are not assembly-line workers or
customer-service representatives. In the case of such lower-level
workers, the goals of the Equal Pay Act can be accomplished due to
the fact that these types of workers perform commodity-like work
and, therefore, should be paid commodity-like salaries. However,
the practical realities of hiring and compensating high-level
executives deal a fatal blow to Equal Pay Act claims. 264
Moreover, in today’s workplaces, routine duties have become increasingly
mechanized or outsourced, with the remaining employees performing varied and
discretionary tasks. 265
In Pao’s case, she complained that her compensation was low because of
her failure to be promoted, the way the firm allocated carried interest from its
261
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investment fund, and the failure to fully compensate her for the value she
delivered. 266 Kleiner-Perkins responded that Pao was “treated better than her alleged
male peers and was in fact paid more during key period at issue.” 267 Pao’s
allegations, however, ultimately depended, not a snapshot of compensation with
male peers at a particular point in time, but rather on the cumulative effect of a series
of subjective decisions.
In addition, while stereotyping goes to the heart of Pao’s claims, the way
the law on gender stereotyping discrimination has developed makes claims of
unconscious, subjective, or cumulative bias difficult to prove. 268 In the original U.S.
Supreme Court case on stereotyping, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 269 the plaintiff,
Ann Hopkins was a candidate for partnership at an accounting giant, and she had an
outstanding record of obtaining major contracts. In denying her partnership, the
partners’ criticism of her included that she cursed, could use a “course at charm
school,” and that if she wanted to make partner at later time, she should “walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry.” 270 The Supreme Court observed that “it takes no
special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an aggressive female
employee as requiring ‘a course in charm school.’” 271 The Court separated language
that it deemed gender stereotyping—such as terms like “macho” and “masculine,”
from language it perceived as gender neutral, but an unfavorable evaluation of her—
that she was “overly aggressive” and “unduly harsh.” 272
Yet, since 1989, employers have become more adept at avoiding references
to “charm school” and other explicitly gendered comments. 273 Instead, sex
266
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stereotyping more typically involves unconscious biases that may “sneak up” on a
decisionmaker. Biases “affect perceptions and evaluations of an employee in
innumerable encounters that occur well before any ultimate moment of workassignment, promotion, or discharge decision. By the time the manager actually
makes such a decision, the die may have already been cast by the earlier biased
perceptions.” 274
Pao’s claims follow the classic scenario: she alleged that the firm
discriminated against her through a series of actions that had a cumulative effect, 275
while the jurors ultimately held against her the fact that her performance reviews
deteriorated over time, so that her termination came as the end result of a long period
of difficulties. 276
Kleiner Perkins effectively used those evaluations against Pao because they
established that she had been on notice of the firm’s concerns about her performance
and failed to make the necessary adjustments. The evaluations referred to “pushing
too hard to establish herself, rather than being collaborative,” 277 being too territorial
and untrustworthy, pursuing her own agenda, and not being “a team player.” 278 A
central part of Pao’s response, however, was that such behavior was typical and
tolerated by male employees, and that some of the perception that she was not a team
player came from her complaints about the firm’s hostile atmosphere for women.
Indeed, one of the jurors most favorable to Pao, who believed that she had been the
victim of discrimination, commented that the male junior partners at Kleiner “had
those same character flaws that Ellen was cited with,” but they were promoted
anyway. 279 In short, Pao’s claim was that she could not get away with the same
self-interested, competitive behavior as the men.
Competitive workplaces intrinsically involve a balance between selfpromotion that benefits the company (how many top clients did Pao land?) and
competitive characteristics that alienate others (Pao’s purported “sharp elbows”).
Indeed, Liars’ Poker described investment banking houses as celebrating traders’
ability to lie – and get away with it. Pao’s claim, presented as an individual case,
amounted to an assertion that Kleiner Perkins got the balance wrong. Yet, her case
attracted attention because it symbolized the limited presence of women in the
venture capital world. In the context of such a case, Pao, who very much wanted to
be in that world, could not truly represent the women who never applied because
they found the entire environment hostile. Nor could Pao present what may be well
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be the most compelling claim against such a system – the claim that the system itself
is intrinsically flawed. The next section will explain how antidiscrimination cases
can combine challenges to the legitimacy of competitive management systems with
claims of disparate gender impact, and how they can enhance the impact of
antidiscrimination law in the process.
B. Antidiscrimination Law and a Structural Equality Approach
As we discussed above, Congress initially adopted Title VII to eliminate
discriminatory employment practices based on a structural analysis that identified
segregated workplaces not only as a source of racial and gender inequality bus also
as an impediment to economic growth. Antidiscrimination law has stalled in the
new era because it is not tied to a comparable structural analysis of the new sources
of inequality and a commitment to evaluate them on their own terms. Consequently,
antidiscrimination law has been unable to address the promotion processes that
determine the benefits of the new economy.
This section argues that reaching these gendered business practices requires
a new approach: substantively engaging the propriety of the practices and linking
them to counterproductive workplaces practices and gender disparities. The
immediate impact of doing so sets up disparate impact cases such as the one against
Microsoft. But the longer-term effect of such an approach, as with the
delegitimization of segregated workplaces, may be greater judicial willingness to
extend existing legal doctrines to reach such practices.
The section frames the analysis of how to move forward by parsing the
elements of disparate impact, first, showing the disparate impact associated with
these business practices. Then, in anticipation of a corporation’s defense, this
section demonstrates that these practices cannot be justified by business necessity
because a wealth of business literature shows that the practices have detrimental
effects on companies and their employees. As for the third element of a disparate
income case, the section shows that less discriminatory alternatives exist, and they
are ones that comparably serve employers’ purposes.
To prove a disparate impact claim, plaintiffs must show that an employer
uses a particular employment practice that has an adverse impact on women. 280
Courts have adopted the EEOC test for what constitutes a “sufficiently substantial”
disparity: when the selection rate for one group is less than 80% of the selection rate
for another group. 281 While the employer may argue that the statistical analysis must
trace to the specific employment practice, plaintiffs can use bottom line statistics—
the end results of hiring or promotional practices—if “the elements of a respondent’s
280
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decision-making process are not capable of separation for analysis.” 282 Once the
plaintiff shows disparate impact, the employer can satisfy its burden by showing a
business necessity, “an overriding legitimate, non-[gender-based] business
purpose.” 283 The plaintiffs can still succeed if they prove that the employer could
have adopted an alternative practices that would comparably serve the employer’s
purposes but not result in the same gender disparities. 284
The conventional practices challenged in disparate impact litigation have
been things like background checks, height and weight requirements, or pencil and
paper tests. 285 Importantly, there is no legal requirement that disparate impact
analysis apply only to formal or written policies; a subjective form of assessment
can be considered a particular employment practice. 286 Yet, until this Article,
completely missing from the discrimination literature is whether the traits that form
the basis for selection can themselves be the basis for disparate impact litigation.
The competitive promotional practices we are discussing have been under
the radar because they simply look like background business decisions. In an early
comparable worth case, American Federation of State, County, & Municipal
Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME) v. Washington, brought as a disparate impact
claim, the plaintiffs had difficulty challenging an entire state-selected system of
compensation based on the market structure. 287 Yet, these challenges to forced
competition and artificial stacking practices are different from assailing market
structures. 288 Within companies, managers are making intentional decisions to
implement appraisal systems that value competition and that have a disparate impact
on women. 289
Seniors have filed and settled several class action lawsuits against major
corporations, such as Ford and Goodyear, arguing that forced ranking systems were
simply disguises for purposeful age-based discrimination. 290 In the case against
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Ford, the plaintiffs showed that older workers were so disproportionately placed in
the lowest category that Ford faced an “almost impossible burden in showing” that
the forced ranking “was job-related and consistent with business necessity.” 291
The systems of negative sum competition, such as stack ranking or rankand-yank, can be shown to have a disparate impact on vulnerable groups. 292 In a
Monte Carlo style simulation study with organizations of various sizes, researchers
determined that a forced ranking system selecting for termination would have
racially disparate effects. In a small organization, if 10% of the workforce were laid
off, the chance of a disparate impact violation would be 5.1%, “and this increases to
an 11.8% likelihood of an [adverse impact] flag when 15% of the workforce is laid
off.” 293 In addition, a forced ranking system insulates subjective reasons for an
assessment behind the cloak of a numerical value, and the system itself may be used
when there are an insufficient number of employees to make curving process
valid. 294 While few comprehensive studies have been undertaken, evidence is
emerging that rank-and-yank methods have gendered effects. For example, in the
information technology industry, a 2016 study shows that the largest factor
correlating with gaps in women’s duration of work in the IT industry was whether a
firm used “rank and yank” methods. 295
If employers seek to justify such systems as a business necessity, they
should find it difficult. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 puts the burden of proof on the
employer to establish this defense by showing that the challenged practice is job
related and “consistent with business necessity. 296 In the original disparate impact
case of Griggs v. Duke Power, 297, for example, the Supreme Court held that the
requirement of a high school diploma was not “significantly related to successful
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job performance” for blue collar workers at a power-generating facility. 298 The
EEOC has recently developed a new guidance to more strongly interrogate blanket
refusals to hire people with any criminal background. 299
By contrast, the negative sum management strategies have been treated as
neutral. When female and African American plaintiffs in a 2001 case against
Microsoft, Donaldson v. Microsoft, challenged its forced ranking system, the court
denied class certification, finding that the results of an individualized rating system
meant that the class claims were not common. 300 The court also dismissed the
disparate impact claims in that suit, finding an absence of statistical evidence
supporting the plaintiffs’ theories. In this earlier Microsoft case, the plaintiffs
simply were not able to show disparities in compensation or promotion decisions
regarding putative class members. 301 Yet, in part, the court prevented that
demonstration by accepting Microsoft’s claim that its assessment system was a
“meritocracy” akin to a grading curve,302 and denying the plaintiffs the ability to
aggregate their numbers in a class action to supply precisely the proof that the court
said was missing. It does not appear that the Donaldson plaintiffs challenged the
competition itself as a gendered metric of evaluation.
Almost fifteen years later, in Moussouris v. Microsoft, the court was initially
dismissive of similar claims, holding that the plaintiffs did not explain why a forced
curve would systematically undervalue women in the tech professions. 303 Yet, the
court allowed the case to proceed after the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
targeting the stack ranking system Microsoft used between 2011 and 2013 as an
invalid performance instrument that has gendered effects. 304 The amended pleading
points out that 80% of the managers who were calibrating their employees’
performance were men, while only 17% of the tech employees whose performances
were being rated were women, and the amended complaint detailed the system’s
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gender-based pay and promotion effects. 305 In October of 2016, the court denied
Microsoft’s second motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs had identified a
specific employment practice—the stack ranking system—that had a disparate
impact on female tech workers.
Microsoft will presumably claim that the system can be justified as a
“business necessity.” 306 The Microsoft environment, however, does not seem
conducive to improving economic performance. 307 Indeed, Vanity Fair, commenting
on Microsoft’s use of the system challenged in the litigation described above,
observed that: “Potential market-busting businesses—such as e-book and
smartphone technology—were killed, derailed, or delayed amid bickering and
power plays.” 308
As the management literature indicates, these ultra-competitive
management systems are bad business practices. 309 And even where these practices
may have some effectiveness in selecting lower-performing workers for termination
in the first year or two, the reliability and validity effects diminish very sharply over
time. 310 Moreover, investors and shareholders are beginning to understand the
shortcomings of negative sum competitions, which are often tied to short-term
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measures of business performance. 311 Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, the
world’s largest global investment management company, wrote a letter to the CEOs
of other leading companies urging a move away from practices that have led to the
maximization of short term profits at the expense of the long term health of
businesses. 312 And studies repeatedly show that employers can adopt a less
discriminatory alternative that could achieve their purposes.313 Management experts
have identified numerous alternative systems that could serve employer goals of
effective employee performance in a comparably effective manner to the challenged
practices. For example, employers could set achievement goals and role-specific
strategies, provide more immediate feedback, both positive and negative, to enhance
project performance, and create action plans rather than move to immediate
termination. 314 In short, these management practices that are associated with gender
disparities are also bad for business, and, consequently, they are – or should be 315 –
indefensible under Title VII.
****
Disparate impact theory has been limited in its effectiveness, for the reasons
indicated in Section I. That is, the suits have been effective where tied to a
determination to root out a discredited practice and ineffective where they seek to
extend Title VII without a substantive analysis that links particular practices not just
to disparate impact per se but to systemic practices that deserve scrutiny. 316
A victory for the Microsoft plaintiffs is therefore likely to encourage
technical evasions. It is difficult to obtain statistical evidence necessary to prove a
disparate impact violation, and companies can ensure that rank and yank evaluations
311
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do not cross the disparate impact threshold. 317 Alternatively, employers can
eliminate the “yank” part of rank and yank while otherwise keeping competitive
rankings. While courts should find it difficult to hold that a discredited practice
meets the business necessity defense, defendants can, nonetheless, more easily
defend a newly reconfigured practice that lacks, at least for the time being, the same
degree of notoriety or established negative effects.318 Nonetheless, this article
suggests that the practices that emphasize destructive competition over collaboration
(or other forms of competition), when they influence recruitment practices,
evaluation and promotion measures, or termination procedures, can be expected to
produce similar gender disparities, and like “rank and yank,” they too should be
illegal absent a demonstration of business necessity. Of course, simply emphasizing
competition does not always produce such disparities, nor is it always unjustified. 319
It is the illegitimacy of the underlying practice, coupled with the statistically
disparate gender effects, that creates the systemic challenge.
For this approach suggested in this Article to be effective, therefore, requires
not just focus on rank and yank, but a broader inquiry into the sources of greater
inequality. A true structural analysis must simultaneously engage gender disparities
and economic inequality.
Consequently, this transformative use of
antidiscrimination law is not just an extension of existing law, but is fundamentally
different in conception from earlier assumptions about Title VII. The analysis goes
to the heart of what are, at once, metrics that produce gender inequalities and that
are also indefensible as appropriate business practices. Indeed, at times, innovations
in governing law prompt social and educational changes much larger than their
doctrinal effects. 320 Regardless of whether disparate impact succeeds in any
individual case, it provides a basis for reviving the vision of antidiscrimination law
as promoting equality both within and outside of the workplace, as challenging
prohibited classifications and systemic economic inequality.
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CONCLUSION
The management revolution that greatly increased executive compensation
(and overall societal inequality), contributed to the financialization of American
business, and dramatically worsened gender disparities at the top of the American
income ladder has been the subject of increasing criticism 321 New studies
demonstrate that companies that have adopted the more competitive and sharefocused corporate culture have performed worse than the supposed bureaucratic
business entities of mid-century America. 322
Once these practices take hold, they do not stop with slowing growth or
counterproductive business models. They also have reinforcing sets of effects on
who gains power, how they conduct business, and the consequences for society a
whole. As this article demonstrates, the focus on outsized money and powers attracts
the select few. The competitive practices that such environments encourage favor
men over women.
The absence of women in top management, the financial sector, and
elsewhere thus serves as a symptom of something more than just the failure of
individual women to ascend to the higher paying positions in American society. It
is also a symptom of the creation of a much more deeply unequal society in ways
that go beyond gender. The same practices that produced gender disparities at
Microsoft, after all, also contributed to the scandals at Enron. 323 And numerous
studies find that large salaries and the concentration of power breeds overconfidence
– and egotism, hubris, and arrogance. 324
These factors then touch off a series of consequences with reinforcing
effects. The top corporations focus more on earnings reports than investment in new
plants, research, or employees. The companies often slash training program or move
operations overseas even when that produces a loss of otherwise needed expertise –
and the decimation of well-paying mid-range jobs in the United States. 325 Retail
companies like Wal-Mart experience pressure to pay their employees little unless
forced by a tighter labor market to pay more than rock bottom salaries. The same
forces contribute to greater corporate and economic instability as the search for the
next unicorn encourages often unjustified risk-taking, and as the incentives to play
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accounting games decrease the reliability and transparency of American business
practices. 326
It is not a solution simply to add women to the upper echelons of
corporations without changing the backdrop template of evaluation. Ellen Pao’s
claim, after all, is that her self-interested behavior should have been tolerated
alongside the men’s. And Carly Fiorina became CEO at Hewlett-Packard in large
part because she had been previously CEO of a smaller company (Lucent
Technologies) whose stock had soared because of “creative accounting and liberal
financing of sales to customers.” 327 Instead, the failure to include women in upper
management should be seen as a sign of management toleration of the types of
environments that contribute to greater inequality, instability, and efforts to rig the
game. 328
The ultimate reform of the system will require, however, not just the
inclusion of women but greater efforts to include pro-social and institution- (rather
than self-) promoting qualities. 329 These qualities include attention to employee
morale, the creation of collaborative work environments that make employee
contributions more than the sum of their parts, 330 longer term horizons, and
reciprocal notions of loyalty that tie employers and employees closer together.
Antidiscrimination efforts, which once assumed a more level playing field
for white men, were designed to ensure women and minority access to the “good”
jobs in the economy. Today, antidiscrimination efforts that target competitive
evaluation systems that discriminate could play a dual role. They could help to
ensure fairer systems for everyone.
They could also become a vehicle for
identifying the counterproductive practices that have made the corporate tournament
a zero sum enterprise.
The doctrinal proposal we make here is intended to reverse the foreground
and background of workplace decisions. For too long, antidiscrimination lawsuits
have focused on individual instances of unequal treatment that have taken place
against a backdrop of negative sum workplace competitions where merit is measured
by short term successes in intensely competitive environments. One example of this
is the stacked ranking system just beginning to be challenged in the Moussouris
litigation for its gendered effects. Our project is broader – we hope to encourage
courts to embrace a commitment to equality that will inform the interpretation of
antidiscrimination law in ways that can withstand the coming era of a conservative
Supreme Court.
Antidiscrimination law has historically had two components: a moral one
– discrimination is wrong – and a structural one, that sought to promote equality for
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workers collectively through efforts to keep in place the factors supporting good
jobs. The legal and economic infrastructure of good jobs at mid-century is
gone. For antidiscrimination law to serve its original purposes means once again
creating a way for equality efforts and antidiscrimination law to operate in
tandem. This article offers a beginning to that effort.
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